Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases:
The Supreme Court\u27s Unfinished Business by Saumier, Geneviève
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 18 Issue 2 Article 7 
10-1-1995 
Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases: The Supreme Court's 
Unfinished Business 
Geneviève Saumier 
University of New Brunswick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Geneviève Saumier, "Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases: The Supreme Court's Unfinished 
Business" (1995) 18:2 Dal LJ 447. 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 





While the shortcomings of the common law rules of private international
law were being reformed by statute in England,' Canadian law, left to
judicial development, remained mired in nineteenth-century thinking. A
much overdue reassessment was finally undertaken by the Supreme
Court earlier this decade. In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye
and Hunt v. T & N plc3 the Court recast the common law rules on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments to conform with its
perception of the "new world order" and Canadian federal structure. It
then proceeded to endow these rules with constitutional authority. Al-
though the Court's emerging restatements of private international law
have generated a growing body of analysis, little attention has been paid
to date to the Court's review of the law on forum non conveniens in
Amchem Products v. BCWCB,4 buried as it was in a case dealing with the
more dramatic topic of anti-suit injunctions. The forum non conveniens
* Ph.D. candidate, Cambridge University; B.Com, B.C.L., LL.B., McGill University. This
paper was written during my tenure as Research Fellow at the Faculty of Law, University of
New Brunswick. I am indebted to Catherine Walsh for her encouragement and challenging
comments on previous drafts. Ed Veitch and Vaughan Black reviewed the text and provided
helpful remarks. The students in my Private International Law class at U.N.B. also deserve
some mention: without their questions, I would not have attempted to clarify these issues.
1. See, in particular, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 27; Civil
Jurisdiction and JudgmentsAct 1991 (U.K.), 1991, c. 12; Contracts (Applicable Law)Act 1990
(U.K.), 1990, c. 36; Family LawAct 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 55; Foreign Limitation Periods Act
1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 16; Recognition of TrustsAct 1987 (U.K.), 1987, c. 14; and Bill 6, Private
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) (U.K.), 1994, that includes a fundamental
reform of choice of law in tort.
2. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256 [hereinafter Morguard cited to S.C.R.].
3. [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 256 [hereinafter Hunt cited to S.C.R.].
4. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, 102 D.L.R. (4th) 96, 3 W.W.R. 441 [hereinafter Amchem cited to
S.C.R.I. To date, only three case comments have appeared, all of which concentrate on the anti-
suit injunction aspect of the case: E. Edinger, (1993) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 366; H.P. Glenn, "The
Supreme Court, Judicial Comity and Anti-Suit Injunctions" (1994) 28 U.B.C. L.Rev. 193 and
J.P. McEvoy, "International Litigation: Canada, Forum Non Conveniens and the Anti-Suit
Injunction" (1995) 17 Advocates' Q. 1. See also J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 3d
ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at 230ff; Castel includes only a summary statement of
Amchem and passing reference to Hunt which was rendered too late for full treatment in the
body of the text.
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aspect of the case is, however, of greater importance if we are to judge by
the burgeoning lower court jurisprudence on that issue alone.'
In Amchem, the Supreme Court formulated a Canadian version of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens,6 borrowing heavily from the House of
Lords' decision in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex.7 The two decisions
part on the question of which party has the burden of proof on an application
to stay an action based on forum non conveniens. In English law, the burden
varies according to the location of service on the defendant. In contrast, the
Supreme Court states that the burden should rest on the party requesting the
stay, in most cases the defendant, on the basis of procedural differences
between English and Canadian rules of international jurisdiction. This can,
however, be varied by provincial rules of procedure.
5. McEvoy, ibid. at 20-29, discusses the thirteen cases that applied the Amchem rule, reported
as of May 1994. Since then, as of March 1995, the following cases have referred toAmchem's
statements regardingforum non conveniens: Webb v. Hooper (1994), 19 A ta L.R. (3d) 269,
7 W.W.R. 324 (Q.B.); B.C. Rail Ltd. v. Call-Net Telecommunications Ltd, (19941 B.C.J. No.
1064 (S.C.); Kelly v. KMart Canada, [ 1994] B.C.J. No. 1098 (S.C.); Frymer v. Brettschneider
(1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 60; Discreet Logic Inc. v. Canada (Registrar of Copyrights) (1994), 55
C.P.R. (3d) 167 (F.C.A.); Provident Life & Accident v. Walton, [1994] 0.J. No. 1909 (Gen.
Div.); Cytoven Int. NV v. Cytomed Peptos, [ 1994] F.C.J./A.C.F. No. 1572; Mannai Properties
v. Horsham Corp., [ 1994] O.J. No. 2038 (Gen. Div.); SDI Simulation Group Inc. v. Chameleon
Technologies Inc., [1994] 0.J. No. 2195 (Gen. Div.); Macdonald v. Lasnier (1994), 21 O.R.
(3d) 177 (Gen. Div.); Metis National Council v. Evans, [1994] O.J. No. 2341 (Gen. Div.);
Tortel Communications v. Suntel, [ 199511 W.W.R. 457 (Man. C.A.); LehndorffManagement
Ltd. v. Gentra Canada Investments Inc., [1994] O.J. No. 3032 (Gen. Div.). The only case
applying the anti-suit injunction test appears to be Re Cadillac Fairview Inc., [ 1995] 0.J. No.
138 (Gen. Div.) where a request to issue an anti-suit injunction against the plaintiff in Chicago
proceedings, because of connected reorganization proceedings in Toronto, was dismissed.
6. The common law source of this doctrine suggests that Amchem is not relevant for Quebec.
Moreover, rules of judicial competence in that province are not service-based but depend upon
the nature of the case; the transformation of procedural rules of service into substantive rules
governing jurisdiction is a peculiarity of the common law. Prior to the reform of its Civil code,
Quebec law on judicial jurisdiction in international cases was simply an extension of its rules
for domestic cases (Code of Civil Procedure, art. 68-75) and did not include any discretion in
the nature of a forum non conveniens doctrine. See generally E. Groffier, Pricis de droit
internationalpriviqubicois, 4th ed. (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1990) at 244-46. Some decisions
had indicated a desire for flexibility in the assumption ofjurisdiction and this has been reflected
in the new rules on private international law that have been comprehensively codified in Title
Three of the Quebec Civil Code. The competence of Quebec courts in international matters is
now regulated separately from domestic matters. While it is not within the ambit of this paper
to discuss this reform, the inclusion of a discretion to decline jurisdiction is of direct concern.
Although article 3135 does not use the expressionforum non conveniens, it is clearly intended
to adopt the doctrine: see H.P. Glenn, "La R6forme du Code civil: Droit international priv"
in Textes rjunis par le Barreau du Quibec et la Chambre des notaires du Quibec (Qudbec:
Presses de l'Universit6 Laval, 1993) 669 at 744; J.A. Talpis & J.-G. Castel, "Interpretation des
r~gles du droit international priv6" in ibid. 801 at 900. As a result, the comments of the Supreme
Court regardingforum non conveniens are relevant to the application of the Quebec provision,
at least in so far as they reflect constitutional limitations on judicial jurisdiction expressed in
Morguard and Hunt.
7. [1987] 1 A.C. 461, [1986] 3 All E.R. 843 [hereinafter Spiliada cited to A.C.].
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According to the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Frymer v.
Brettschneider,8 this provincial power to determine the burden of proof
in stay proceedings has been exercised in the Ontario Rules of Civil
Procedure. Implicitly overturning previous lower court decisions that had
followed Amchem's general rule,9 the Ontario court put forward a
variation of the English rule allocating the burden of proof according to
the residence of the defendant as opposed to the location of service.
This paper focusses on the reasoning in both Amchem and Frymer on
the burden of proof issue. Despite its apparent innocuity, this issue
provides an interesting perspective for an appraisal of the current state of
Canadian law of international jurisdiction. This approach illustrates how
the failure of appellate courts to address adequately the implications of
Morguard and Huntl° on the burden issue is symptomatic of a more
general failure to articulate an integrated approach to jurisdiction in
international cases. Until the Supreme Court confronts this more complex
issue, its attempts to rationalize Canadian private international law are
unlikely to progress or succeed. The paper is divided into five parts: the
first three examine the doctrine of forum non conveniens including the
burden of proof issue as it moves from England to the Supreme Court and
then to other Canadian courts; the fourth part presents an alternative
approach to the burden of proof issue and the fifth suggests a methodol-
ogy for the assessment of judicial jurisdiction in international cases that
integrates the constitutive elements of jurisdiction and conforms to the
Supreme Court's general statements about Canadian private international
law.
8. (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 60 (C.A.) [hereinafter Frymer].
9. Upper Lakes Shipping Ltd. v. Foster Yeoman Ltd. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 548, 17 C.P.C. (3d)
150 (Gen. Div.) and Applied Processes Inc. v. Crane Co. (1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 166 (Gen. Div.).
10. Supra note 3. In Morguard, the Supreme Court revised the common law rules on
recognition of foreign judgments. A successful plaintiff was seeking to enforce an Alberta
default judgment in British Columbia. The Court held that the federal structure of Canada
warranted a broadening of the common law rules of recognition, at least between provinces,
akin to the full faith and credit clauses in the American and Australian constitutions. Because
the case had not been argued in constitutional terms, the decision left open the possibility that
provincial legislatures could enact stricter rules. Two years later, in Hunt, the Supreme Court
was confronted with a Quebec blocking statute that sought to prevent the enforcement of an
order for the production of documents for discovery in a British Columbia case. The plaintiff
argued that the Quebec statute was unconstitutional in that it interfered with litigation in
another province and resulted in the refusal to enforce the British Columbia Court's order. The
Supreme Court seized the opportunity to give a constitutional grounding to its decision in
Morguard, holding that the Canadian federal structure required that provincial judgments be
recognized and enforced throughout the country if the rendering court had appropriately
assumed jurisdiction. This latter condition was expressed in terms of a "real and substantial
connection" between the forum and the case, similar to that articulated by the House of Lords
in Indyka v. Indyka, [1969] 1 A.C. 33.
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I. Forum non conveniens and the Burden
of Proof in English Law
At common law, English courts have jurisdiction "as of right" over
defendants who can be served with a writ within the territory, regardless
of the lack of any further connection between the defendant, the case and
the chosen forum. As a result, English courts originally had no jurisdic-
tion to hear a case concerning a tort committed in England or a breach of
contract occurring therein, so long as the defendant remained abroad
(unless the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court). To
remedy this weakness in the common law rule, legislation was enacted to
confer judicial competence over defendants outside the territory at the
time of service (also called "assumed jurisdiction"). From 1852 on, it
became possible to effect service of an English writ outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts, with leave of the court.1 ' This system persists
to this day, maintaining the distinction between service within (injuris)
and service outside (exjuris) the jurisdiction. Under the current English
procedure of Order 11, a plaintiff wishing to serve a defendant abroad
must convince the English court that the case is one which is "proper for
service out of the jurisdiction." In addition to demonstrating that the claim
falls within an enumerated category in the statute, the plaintiff must also
show "not merely... that England is the appropriate forum for the trial
of the action, but that ... this is clearly so. ' 12
This control of the assertion of English jurisdiction over foreign
defendants arises from the common law's traditional concern with state
sovereignty. The service of an English writ in a foreign country was
analogous to an invasion of that country's sovereignty, thus warranting
permission of the court coupled with a heavy burden on the plaintiff
seeking leave. This understanding of exclusive territorial sovereignty
11. Service exjuris was first introduced in England in 1852 with the Common Law Procedure
Act (now Order 11 of the Supreme Court) to temper the strictures of the common law rule. At
common law, power over the defendant was the foundation ofjurisdiction. By entering into the
territory of the sovereign, the defendant was subjecting him or herself to that power. In addition,
a presence-based rule ensured that a single court would be competent to try a case, in
conformity with the notion of exclusivity of jurisdiction. It followed that residence or even
domicile within the jurisdiction was insufficient to establish judicial competence even where
the cause of action was purely domestic, such as a tort committed on the territory. See Cheshire
& North's Private International Law, 12th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1922) at 183-84 and
190 [hereinafter Cheshire & North].
12. Spiliada, supra note 7 at 481. For an English court, the categories under Order 1 1 include:
a claim on a contract made in England or governed by English law (Rule 1(1)(d)); a claim on
a tort committed in England or causing damage therein (Rule 1(1)(f)); a claim of unjust
enrichment where the liability is said to arise out of acts committed in England (Rule 1 (1)(t));
a claim related to land situated in England (Rule 1 (1)(g)). See generally Cheshire & North, ibid.
at 191-203.
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also informed the common law rules on recognition and enforcement of
foreign in personam judgments. Paralleling the common law jurisdic-
tional rules for foreign defendants, the English common law rules
regarding enforcement of foreign judgments essentially require that the
foreign court be considered to have had jurisdiction "as of right" over the
defendant for its judgment to be given effect by an English court. 3
According to the "theory of obligation" that is held to justify recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments, it is only where jurisdiction was
legitimately exercised by the foreign court that the "debt" created by the
foreign judgment can be enforced, by the judgment creditor against the
judgment debtor, in an English court. The statute-based competence of
English courts over foreign defendants does not extend by analogy to
foreign courts. Assumed jurisdiction under Order 11 continues to be seen
as exorbitant and an English court will not recognize a similar assumption
of jurisdiction by a foreign court.14 The fact that the English court would
have considered itself competent mutatis mutandis, or that the foreign
court would have recognized the English courts' assumption of jurisdic-
tion, is insufficient to justify giving direct effect to a foreign judgment.
This follows from the fact that the common law rules of "international
jurisdiction" are not based on reciprocity or comity.
In certain legal systems, a court competent to hear a dispute may
nonetheless grant a stay of proceedings and decline to exercise its
jurisdiction on the basis that it is not the most appropriate forum to decide
the case. The doctrine governing the discretion to decline jurisdiction is
commonly referred to as the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The
classic formulation of the doctrine derives from Scots law and seeks to
direct the case to be decided by the forum where "the interest of all parties
and... the ends of justice"' 5 would best be served.
Traditionally, English courts had refused to consider arguments of
convenience or appropriateness as grounds for declining to exercise
jurisdiction. Stays of proceedings were extremely rare, save in situations
of lis alibi pendens or where there had been some abuse of process by the
13. The recognition and enforcement in England ofjudgments from most European countries
is governed by the CivilJurisdiction andJudgments Act 1982 and 1991 that enact the European
conventions on recognition and enforcement currently in force within the European Union and
EFTA. The traditional common law rules remain applicable to non-contracting states in the
absence of a bilateral convention dealing with foreign judgments, for eg. the Convention
Between Canada and the United Kingdomfor the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1984, R.S.C. 1985, c. 30, in force in most
Canadian provinces.
14. See generally, Cheshire & North, supra note 11 at 346.
15. Sim v. Robinow (1892), 19 R. 665 at 668, per Lord Kinnear. See A. Briggs, "Forum Non
Conveniens-Now We Ate Ten?" (1983) 3 Legal Studies 74 at 80.
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plaintiff. This required the demonstration that "the continuation of the
action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or
vexatious to" the defendant.16 However, no stay would be granted if it
would cause injustice to the plaintiff, often defined in terms of the loss of
ajuridical advantage available in the forum. 7 In a series of cases since the
1970s, this restrictive approach was broadened and the first branch of the
test was gradually transformed into one based on forum non conveniens,
eschewing the abuse of process aspect. 8 Although the revised English
doctrine was originally established in MacShannon v. Rockware Glass,19
the House of Lords refused to expressly equate it with the Scottish
doctrine; it was only in The Abidin Daver20 that the patent indistinguish-
ability between the English test of appropriateness and the doctrine of
forum non conveniens was finally admitted.
This evolution culminated with the House of Lords' decision in
Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex.2 1 While recognizing its Scottish
source, Lord Goff sought to preserve the peculiarities of the doctrine's
historical development within English law. To this end, he maintained an
exception to the primary principle of appropriateness where "justice
requires that the trial should nevertheless take place in this country.
22
The test for a stay under Spiliada consists, therefore, of a general rule
based on the identification of the more appropriate forum to hear the case,
coupled with an exception in favour of the plaintiff. Lord Goff specified
that the criteria relevant to appropriateness were of the nature of connect-
ing factors that would enable the court to identify the forum with the
''most real and substantial connection" to the action; these were said to
include
not only factors affecting convenience or expense (such as availability of
witnesses), but also other factors such as the law governing the relevant
16. St Pierre v. South American Stores, [1936] 1 K.B. 382, per Scott L.J.
17. Juridical advantages can be either substantive or procedural. The former refers to an
advantage flowing from the substantive law that would be applied by the forum; this depends
on the choice-of-law rules applicable in the forum and therefore may differ from one country
to another. More common are claims regarding procedural advantages such as speed of trial,
higher damages, awards of interest or costs, extent of discovery process, availability of
contingency fees, etc. See Cheshire & North at 227-230, supra note 11 and cases cited therein.
18. For enlightening discussion on this development see A. Briggs, supra note 15 and "The
Staying of Actions on the Ground of 'Forum Non Conveniens' in England Today" (1984)
L.M.C.L.Q. 227; R. Schuz, "Controlling Forum Shopping" (1986) 35 I.C.L.Q. 374.
19. [1978] A.C. 795 (H.L.).
20. [1984] A.C. 398 (H.L.).
21. For a commentary on Spiliada, see P.B. Carter, (1989) B.Y.B.I.L. 342.
22. Supra note 7 at 476.
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transaction.., and the places where the parties respectively reside or carry
on business."
Judicial discretion operates in both instances, first in balancing these
criteria and second in assessing any injustice to the plaintiff denied the
opportunity of pursuing the case in the forum.
As to the burden of proof, its allocation continues to depend on
the nature of service on the defendant. Where jurisdiction is founded "as
of right" (service in juris), that is, where the court's competence is
unquestioned, the defendant challenging the jurisdiction carries the onus
of designating the clearly more appropriate foreign court, thereby show-
ing that the domestic court is forum non conveniens. It is because of the
a priori competence of the court that the defendant faces a heavy burden,
being required to impugn the appropriateness of the domestic forum and
to identify the foreign court "which is clearly or distinctly more appropri-
ate than the English forum."24
On the other hand, where the defendant is served out of the jurisdiction
(exjuris), the plaintiff must initially have obtained leave of the court. To
this end, he must have satisfied the court that it was clearly the more
appropriate forum. Therefore, in a challenge to the jurisdiction by the
defendant, the motion is to set aside service ex juris. As a result, the
burden remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the court's discretion
was properly exercised in the original leave application, that is to say, that
the English court was and remains the forum conveniens. Indeed, in the
case of service exjuris, the court is only competent pursuant to a justified
exercise of its discretion to grant leave to serve abroad; hence the motion
to set aside the writ attacks the very jurisdictional competence of the
court.
In Spiliada the Canadian defendant was contesting exjuris service of
process in British Columbia. The case was not, therefore, concerned with
a motion for a stay of English proceedings, but it involved instead a
challenge to the exercise of the English court's discretion to allow service
out of the jurisdiction. One of the major contributions of Spiliada, besides
its refinement of the forum non conveniens doctrine, remains its conclu-
sion that the doctrine governs the exercise of discretion over international
jurisdiction in all cases, regardless of the type of service. This resolved the
apparent divergence between speeches by Lord Diplock and Lord
23. Ibid. at 478. As to the exception, Briggs, supra note 15 at 82-83, suggests that the second
tier of the test is an English peculiarity not found in the Scottish doctrine and probably "grafted
onto the English rule with a view to distancing [it] ... from the Scottish rule."
24. Spiliada, supra note 7 at 477.
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Wilberforce in Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v. Kuwait Insur-
ance, on the test applicable for challenges to service exjuris2 5
In so concluding, the House of Lords emphasized that the identical
nature of the tests did not remove all matters of distinction between the
two situations: service injuris and exjuris remained distinct in terms of
the object and the burden of proof.2 6 Thus, while Spiliada confirmed that
in both the in juris and ex juris cases the central consideration is the
appropriateness of the forum, Lord Goff specified that the forum under
scrutiny in a given case reflects the burden of proof allocation: the
plaintiff must justify the local forum while the defendant must defend a
foreign choice. And while the plaintiff always has the burden of establish-
ing jurisdiction, either the plaintiff or the defendant may have the onus on
a challenge to the exercise of jurisdiction. 27 This onus is certainly heavier
than a typical civil burden since it requires a demonstration that the
preferred forum is clearly and distinctly more appropriate than the
alternative one.
The main reason for retaining the variable burden lies in the limitation
on the English court's authority to allow leave to serve ex juris under
Order 1 1.28 This in turn stems from the perception that jurisdiction
assumed under these provisions is of an exorbitant nature.29 Caution in the
assumption of long-arm jurisdiction over foreign defendants is therefore
warranted. The same principles are said to justify the narrow rules of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The interaction
between the various elements of judicial jurisdiction--common law,
statutory and international-gives rise to this complex structure in
English law.
25. [1984] A.C. 50 (H.L.). See Schuz, supra note 18 at 407.
26. Spiliada, supra note 7 at 480.
27. This is equally applicable to service in juris since the plaintiff must allege and prove that
the defendant was validly served.
28. Service of process on a defendant outside of England (and Wales) with leave of the court
is governed by the Rules of the Supreme Court, more precisely, rule 1(1) of Order 11. Service
without leave is governed by rule 1(2) and is mainly confined to cases covered by the Civil
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, supra note 1 where the defendant is domiciled in a contracting
State of the Brussels (EU) or Lugano (EU/EFTA) Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. See generally Cheshire & North, supra note
11 at c.l 1.
29. In Spiliada Lord Goff prefers to speak of "extraordinary jurisdiction", considering that
exorbitant "is... an old-fashioned word which perhaps carries unfortunate overtones." Supra
note 7 at 481.
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II. Forum Non Conveniens and the
Burden of Proof in Amchem
In Amchem, Sopinka J., writing for a unanimous court, reviewed the
Canadian cases and concluded that courts in the common law jurisdic-
tions had generally applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens when
considering motions to stay proceedings. In restating the rule for Canada, 0
the Supreme Court basically adopted the Spiliada formulation though
modifying it in two important respects.
First, Sopinka J. subsumed the exception based on injustice to the
plaintiff into the general principle governing the identification of the
appropriate forum. In his view, the exception had evolved within the
particular historical development of the forum non conveniens doctrine
in English law, "which started with two branches at a time when
oppression to the defendant and injustice to the plaintiff were the dual
bases for granting... a stay."'31 Absent similar circumstances in Canada,
Sopinka J. held that "there is no reason in principle why the loss of
juridical advantage [to the plaintiff] should be treated as a separate and
distinct condition.
32
The argument that a party should be allowed to benefit from juridical
advantages available in an appropriate forum is, on its face, unobjection-
able. The Supreme Court went beyond this, however, by holding that
juridical advantages could play a role in the determination of the appro-
priate forum. The weight attributed to any such advantage was said to
30. On the impact of the case for Quebec, see supra note 6. The court in Amchem was being
asked to grant an anti-suit injunction against plaintiffs in Texas proceedings. The defendants
were manufacturers of asbestos products, with various levels of commercial presence in Texas,
facing a products liability claim by British Columbia workers. The defendants preferred the suit
to proceed in British Columbia instead of Texas, mainly in an attempt to avoid the potentially
higher damage awards in the American state. The Supreme Court refused to grant the
injunction, primarily on the basis that the Texas court was not aforum non conveniens.
31. See supra at notes 18-20.
32. Amchem, supra note 4 at 919-20. The Court also looked to Antares Shipping v. The Ship
"Capricorn" (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 422, 65 D.L.R. (3d) 105, for support. In that case, the
Supreme Court was considering the principle governing the discretion to allow service exjuris
under s. 307 of the Federal Court Rules in admiralty cases. The Court in Amchem sought
support for its restatement of theforum non conveniens doctrine in Antares on the grounds that
there had been no reference to a two-tiered test in Antares. However, Antares was concerned
with an order to serve exjuris, and no reference to a two-tieredforum non conveniens test would
have arisen since that test had evolved in relation to stays of proceedings following service in
juris. At the timeAntares was decided, English courts still applied two different tests depending
on whether the issue was discretion to serve exjuris or to stay proceedings and nothing in
Antares suggests that Canadian courts had adopted a different approach. The unification of the
test in English law was not to occur until Spiliada, ten years later. It is therefore not surprising
that the Court in Antares would make no mention of a two-tiered test; its validity as authority
for a rejection of such a test is therefore open to doubt.
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depend on whether it existed in a forum with which the case had a real and
substantial connection. Since the appropriateness of a forum is defined
according to the real and substantial connection test, the implication is
that a juridical advantage sought in an appropriate forum is not only
legitimate, but is also indicative of the appropriateness of that forum.
Beyond the logical difficulty of this aspect of Amchem, it significantly
departs from Spiliada by according to juridical advantages a role in the
determination of appropriateness.
According to the test formulated in Spiliada, juridical advantage is not
considered in determining the appropriateness of a particular forum. Lord
Goff specifically resisted the inference that a mere juridical advantage to
the plaintiff could reverse a decision to stay based on the appropriateness
test.33 Given that a juridical advantage to the plaintiff will often be a
disadvantage to the defendant, attributing conclusive weight to the
former would too easily defeat the general principle guiding the courts'
exercise of discretion: the interests of both parties and the ends of justice.
In addition, previous English cases had already cautioned against the
legal chauvinism involved in comparing legal systems in terms of their
juridical advantages.34 The restriction of the exception to protect a
plaintiff only against a deprivation of "substantial justice" marked the
liberalization of Spiliada's version of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine.35 It is arguable that, after Spiliada, little remains of the juridical
advantage exception beyond breaches of natural or substantive justice
very narrowly defined. It would seem, therefore, that in collapsing the
exception into the general principle, the Supreme Court of Canada has
given juridical advantage a broader role and content than it ever had in
English law.
The second modification to the Spiliada doctrine relates to the burden
of proof on stay applications. In Amchem, Sopinka J. noted that most
Canadian common law provinces had done away with the requirement to
obtain prior leave of the court for service ex juris.3 6 As a result, most
provincial statutes governing jurisdiction over foreign defendants appear
to treat in juris and ex juris cases alike from a procedural standpoint.
Unlike the English process in Order 11, the absence of a leave requirement
33. In particular, Lord Goff rejected the MacShannon test enunciated by Lord Diplock that
gave much weight to the plaintiff's situation. (Spiliada, supra note 7 at 482-84.)
34. For e.g. The Abidin Daver, supra note 20.
35. Supra note 21 at 4 8 2.
36. Two provinces still follow England: Alberta and Newfoundland, as does the Federal
Court. One province, Nova Scotia, requires leave for service outside of Canada or the U.S.A.
All other common law provinces specify conditions under which service ex juris will be
without leave; a residual discretion to allow service with leave is usually retained.
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means that the plaintiff is no longer required to justify, a priori, its choice
of forum. Instead, the potential inadequacy of a court's jurisdiction in a
concrete case must be contested ex post facto upon a challenge by the
defendant, regardless of the locus of service. Under this system, a court's
assumption of jurisdiction is not subject to substantive review; only
procedural issues regarding the validity of service are of relevance.
Sopinka J.'s rather casual treatment of this issue also stems from a belief
that it is a trivial one. In his view, the burden of proof will rarely matter
because "it only applies in cases in which the judge cannot come to a
determinate decision on the basis of the material presented by the
parties."37 Considering, however, that Amchem requires the judge to be
persuaded that a court is clearly and distinctly more appropriate than
another, the onus may be critical in complex cases exhibiting multiple
connections.
Sopinka J. also concluded that the separate allocation of the burden of
proof in English taw was merely procedural and arose solely from the
retention of the leave requirement under Order 11. It is clearly within
provincial competence to determine the procedural aspects of a
jursidictional challenge.38 In the absence of provincial intervention,
Amchem represents the new common law rule in Canada: where service
exjuris does not require prior leave of the court, ajurisdictional challenge
will be decided according to the doctrine of forum non conveniens-
excluding the Spiliada exception-and the defendant will carry the onus
of identifying the foreign court that is clearly and distinctly more
appropriate than the court chosen by the plaintiff.
Treating the burden of proof allocation in Spiliada as historically
contingent, Sopinka J. was able to dismiss it on the basis that the
procedural aspects of jurisdictional challenges in English law did not
correspond to the common Canadian reality. By focussing on the prior
leave requirement, no attention was paid to the allocation's other ratio-
nale in English law, the exorbitant nature of service exjuris and the
burden on the plaintiff to justify it. The suggestion in Amchem that the
Spiliada rule is merely a result of the statutory constraints of Order 11
ignores the complex structure of the jurisdictional system in English law.
Had the question been approached from a broader perspective, the
Supreme Court would have had to consider the impact of the general
principles articulated in Morguard on its formulation of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens including the burden of proof issue. In addition to
37. Amchem, supra note 4 at 921. See further Edinger, supra note 4 at 375, who describes this
statement by the Court as "incomprehensible".
38. Amchem, supra note 4 at 921.
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these general problems, the abortive nature of the inquiry in Amchem
provides little guidance to courts on the burden of proof issue in stay
applications. The impact of this omission is apparent in Frymer 9 where
the Ontario Court of Appeal divided on the interpretation of its rules of
procedure, thereby underlining many of the difficulties not addressed by
the Supreme Court in Amchem.
III. The Amchem Doctrine in Practice:
Frymer v. Brettschneider
Frymer, the first appellate level decision to applyAmchem, is all the more
instructive because the decision at first instance was rendered before
Amchem.40 At trial, Adams J. followed the Spiliada formulation of the
forum non conveniens doctrine including its rule on the distribution of the
burden of proof. The defendant had been served ex juris in Alberta
pursuant to Ontario's rules of service.4" In deciding whether to grant a
stay, Adams J. imposed the burden on the plaintiff to show that Ontario
was clearly the more appropriate forum to hear the action. The judge felt
confident that this allocation of the burden was justified because, in his
view, the abolition in Ontario of the prior leave requirement for service
ex juris had not radically altered the underlying substantive principles
governing jurisdiction based on service exjuris.4"
The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal but
divided on the burden of proof issue. Arbour J.A., McKinlay J.A.
concurring, considered that the burden of proof issue was a question of
provincial law to "be resolved by an analysis of the applicable rules [of
procedure .,,43 She did not restrict this analysis to an interpretation of the
technical wording of the procedural rules governing service exjuris but
39. Supra note 8. In Frymer, a distribution agreement concerning assets under a Florida trust
was being contested by an Ontario-resident beneficiary who claimed that the Alberta-resident
trustee had exercised undue influence to obtain her consent to the distribution agreement. The
distribution agreement had been drawn up in Florida and was expressly stated to be governed
by the law of Florida; it was signed in Montreal, Quebec, where the plaintiff resided at the time.
The Ontario court concluded that Florida was clearly the more appropriate forum to hear the
case and therefore set aside service on the Calgary defendant and stayed the action.
40. The decision of the General Division is reported at (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 157,9 C.P.C. (3d)
264.
41. Specifically Rules 17.02(d) and (h).
42. Adams J. found support in Singh v. Howden Petroleum (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 769, (1980)
100 D.L.R. (3d) 121 (C.A.); and in United Oilseed Products v. Royal Bank of Canada (1988),
29 C.P.C. (2d) 28 (Alta C.A.) which endorsed the Spiliada test including its attribution of
burden. It should be recalled, however, that Alberta still requires prior leave of the court for
service exjuris.
43. Frymer, supra note 8 at 80.
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looked instead to the source and scope of the forum non conveniens
doctrine in Ontario law." Her conclusion was that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens had its source in the inherent power of the court to control
its own process and that the inclusion of the doctrine in the Ontario Rules
of Civil Procedure (as part of the 1985 amendments) merely confirmed
its application to cases of service exjuris.45 Being a doctrine of general
application, its specific application to stays in exjuris cases was "only of
marginal significance in the appreciation of the scope of forum non
conveniens in Ontario .. ."'I The continued availability of the doctrine
outside the service exjuris context meant that the doctrine had retained
its common law source, including modalities such as the burden of proof.
In the absence of legislation imposing a particular onus, the presumption
remained that it should be allocated according to common law rules.
Arbour J.A. did not then simply import the burden distribution from
Spiliada. Instead, she significantly altered the rule by adopting a connect-
ing factor based on the residence of the defendant as opposed to the
location of service. In her view, on a motion to stay, the plaintiff should
bear the onus of establishing the greater appropriateness of the domestic
forum where the defendant is a non-resident; in all other cases, the
resident defendant carries the burden of identifying the more appropriate
foreign forum.4 7 In the case before her, the defendant was a non-resident
44. This approach is certainly justified by Sopinka J.'s own argument that the appropriateness
of the forum is the underlying principle. It only makes sense, therefore, to look beyond the
specific rules on service exjuris to determine the onus issue.
45. This was not the first time that the precise intersection betweenforum non conveniens and
the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure was being scrutinized. See E. Edinger, "The MacShannon
Test for Discretion: Defence and Delimitation" (1986) 64 Can. Bar Rev. 283 at 301. In Roger
Grandmaitre Ltd. v. Canadian Int'l Paper Co. (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 137 (Gen. Div.), aff'd
(1977) 18 O.R. (2d) 175n (C.A.), the power of a court to decline jurisdiction on the basis of
forum non conveniens was questioned following the 1975 removal of the leave requirement for
service ex juris. There Robins J. favoured the doctrine's survival on the grounds that the
discretion conferred by it could not be abolished by amendments to rules of procedure. The
Court went on to decline jorisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. Although this
decision was confirmed on appeal, the appeal decision left unanswered the question whether
a general discretion, beyond forum non conveniens, had survived the abolition of leave. In
Singh, supra note 42, the Court of Appeal held that any grounds previously used to refuse leave
to serve abroad could be relied upon to declinejurisdiction despite a plaintiff's compliance with
the rules for service exjuris. This broader holding appears to have been repealed in the latest
amendment to the rules in 1985. Under the current rules, once service ex juris is authorized
without leave,forum non conveniens provides the only available ground for a stay if the court
has jurisdiction. Rule 17.06(2)(c) uses the expression: "Ontario is not a convenient forum for
the hearing of the proceeding." Although the substance offorum non conveniens involves more
than mere convenience, the Rule is considered to put the doctrine on a statutory basis. The
adoption of "convenient" was part of a general attempt to delatinize the rules.
46. Frymer, supra note 8 at 84.
47. Ibid. at 84-85.
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and therefore the burden rested on the plaintiff. Thus while Arbour J.A.
retained the Spiliada "as of right" distinction, she changed the definition
of the "as of right" criterion. Unfortunately, she offered no further
explanation for her choice of residence as the relevant distinguishing
factor except to state that it "accords with the principles of comity upon
which the doctrine of forum non conveniens rests. 4 8 Nor is there any
discussion of the observation in Amchem that residence may be manipu-
lated "for tax or other reasons notwithstanding the defendant has a real
and substantial connection with this country."49
Her conclusion on the burden of proof issue is, on its face, inconsistent
with the decision in Amchem. True, Sopinka J. recognized that the issue
ultimately depended on the particular provincial rules for service exjuris.
If, however, the allocation of the burden is not explicitly prescribed by the
rules of service themselves, then the general common law rule stated in
Amchem should govern, placing the burden on the defendant seeking a
stay. The Supreme Court has replaced the rule on the allocation, of the
burden put forth in Spiliada with its own version, applicable throughout
the common law provinces in the absence of clear statutory modification,
save perhaps where prior leave is still required for service exjuris.0 As
a result, it is no longer open to provincial courts to refer to English
precedent, directly or indirectly, in construing their provincial rules of
procedure on service ex juris.
Weiler J.A., in her partial dissent, held that the burden of proof should
have rested on the defendant, not the plaintiff.5' This conclusion was
reached on the grounds that Morguard's foreign judgment recognition
rule had rejected the notion of exorbitant jurisdiction traditionally asso-
ciated with service exjuris.52 Weiler J.A. stated that this change in the
rules of recognition severed the last link with the English common law
enunciated in Spiliada, a link that had already been significantly weak-
ened by the abolition of the leave requirement for service ex juris.53 In
other words, the removal of the "exorbitant" epithet was equivalent to
extending the "as of right" qualifier to all justifiable exercises ofjurisdic-
tion based on Morguard's real and substantial connection test. Despite its
initial consistency with the Morguard test for jurisdiction, this minority
48, Ibid. at 85.
49. Supra note 4 at 921.
50. Where service is granted by leave of the court, it may be possible to imply that the
plaintiff's burden to justify service exjuris is maintained in a motion to set aside service.
51. Frymer, supra note 8 at 67. She found that in this case, the burden of proof would not have
affected the conclusion in relation to the appropriate forum.
52. Ibid. at 75.
53. Ibid. at 77.
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view is vulnerable. According to Weiler J.A., "there is a real and
substantial connection to the subject matter of the action when service is
made pursuant to rule 17.02 [of the Ontario Rules]."54 Why any rule for
service exjuris necessarily conforms to the real and substantial connec-
tion test is not explained further and the correctness of that assertion is
doubtful. Since Hunt, it is clear that the basic parameters of judicial
jurisdiction are defined as a matter of constitutional law according to the
principles articulated in Morguard.55 Provincial rules for service exjuris
are therefore subject to constitutional scrutiny. 56 By the time Frymer was
decided it was no longer possible simply to assert, as Weiler J.A. did, that
"the instances in which an action is recognized as having a real connec-
tion with Ontario are set out in rule 17.02.'57 If a constitutional challenge
had been made-as indeed appears to have been done 58-the court should
have considered it first instead of choosing to dismiss the appeal on the
grounds of forum non conveniens.
This suggested approach was taken in Macdonald v. Lasnier59 where
on a motion to stay proceedings, the defendant argued that the court either
had no jurisdiction or, alternatively, that Ontario was not the appropriate
forum to try the action. The plaintiff had served the defendant exjuris, in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 17.02(h), on the basis that damage
had been suffered in Ontario as a result of a tort allegedly committed in
Quebec. Cunningham J. agreed with the defendant's objection that
Morguard had "placed significant limits upon the initiation of such
actions, requiring a real and substantial connection between Ontario and
the action." 6 In his view, the mere fact that Rule 17 pennitted service ex
juris where damage was suffered in Ontario was not enough; constitu-
tional imperatives required a sufficiently real and substantial connection
with Ontario to give the Court jurisdiction. Having found no such
connection, the Court stayed the action. Cunningham J. then went on to
consider the alternative forum non conveniens argument and arrived at
54. Ibid.
55. The possibility of a constitutional challenge to jurisdiction based on traditional division
of powers arguments had already been implicit in Moran v. Pyle National (1974), [1975]
S.C.R. 393, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 239; and more recently in Dupont v. Taronga Holdings (1986),
[1987] R.J.Q. 124,49 D.L.R. (4th) 335 (Que. Sup. Ct.). See generally, P.W. Hogg, Constitu-
tional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 328-335.
56. See for example, Wilson v. Moyes (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 202 (Gen. Div.) and Mathias
Colomb Band of Indians v. Saskatchewan Power Corp., [1993] 6 W.W.R. 153 (Man. Q.B.),
aff'd Il1 D.L.R. (4th) 83 (Man. C.A.).
57. Frymer, supra note 8 at 75.
58. Ibid. at 77-78.
59. (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 177 (Gen. Div.).
60. Ibid. at 181.
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the same conclusion. It is submitted that this approach is the preferred one
on principle. The doctrine of forum non conveniens only applies if the
court is competent to hear the case in the first place: it is a discretion to
decline jurisdiction, not an apriori condition ofjurisdiction. 6' Even if the
plea of forum non conveniens is an alternative plea, the court should
decide the challenge to the jurisdiction first before considering whether
to exercise or decline to exercise its validly established competence over
the defendant.
The problematic aspect of the Court's reasoning concerns the burden
of proof issue. Referring to Amchem, Cunningham J. held that the "onus
of displacing the forum selected by the plaintiff should be with the
defendant. '62 He did not justify why the Amchetn rule on the burden of
proof, applicable in a forum non conveniens context, should be equally
applicable to a primary jurisdictional challenge based on the Morguard
test. Nor did he consider whether Frymer had altered the Amchem rule for
Ontario. This is peculiar since Frymer was cited in the body of the
judgment as the "law in the Province of Ontario" on the question offorum
non conveniens.63 Cunningham J.'s conclusion is, nevertheless, justified
on other reasoning: it is consonant with the general rule that the party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proof.64 It
must be observed, however, that the rule differs somewhat in the case of
a challenge based on the Charter where a shift in burdens onto a party
seeking to justify a breach will normally follow a prima facie case of
breach.65 Since the jurisdictional principles elaborated in Morguard and
61. Where leave of the court is retained for service exjuris, the two aspects can be subsumed
into one depending on the specifics of the rules of procedure. If, as in Alberta's Rule 30 or
England's Order 11, rule 1, a claim must fall within an enumerated head, the court's decision
will be two-stepped: first a determination that the particular claim falls within the category
(jurisdiction) and second that the court should give leave to serve (discretion). Where, on the
other hand, the rules are not particularized, as in Nova Scotia, the court's decision does not
distinguish between the two elements. The latter scenario is the exceptional one since only
Nova Scotia retains this model for rules of service in Canada.
62. Supra note 59 at 183.
63. Ibid. But see Trepanier v. Kloster Cruise Ltd (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 398 (Gen. Div.) where
the court combined the appropriateness test from Amchem and the burden allocation from
Frymer to resolve aforum non conveniens claim by the defendant. The case was complicated
by the presence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause (designating Florida) in what the court
described as a consumer contract. Thus, although the onus was ostensibly on the plaintiff-
consumer to justify her choice of forum, the "onerous and complicated" terms in the contract
appeared to turn the tables against the corporate defendant seeking to enforce the jurisdic-
tional clause. Compare the recent contrary finding by the U.S. Supreme Court in Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 U.S. 1522 (1991).
64. Hogg, supra note 55 at 390-91.
65. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act .1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter]. See Hogg,
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constitutionalized in Hunt are not exclusively based on division of
powers, 66 it is at least possible that a different presumption as to the
burden of proof is applicable to a primary jurisdictional challenge. La
Forest J. did suggest in Morguard that section 7 of the Charter "might,
at least in certain circumstances, play a role" in determining the appropri-
ateness of jurisdiction.
67
Despite certain promising signs in Macdonald v. Lasnier and the
minority approach in Frymer, the interaction between the establishment
of jurisdiction and the discretion to decline jurisdiction on grounds of
forum non conveniens has not been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.
In addition to confusion regarding the burden of proof issue on aforum
non conveniens claim, there is currently no solution to the burden issue
on a constitutional challenge based on the Morguard real and substantial
connection rule, save an unreasoned extension of the rule in Amchem.
Some responsibility for this result must lie with the decision in Amchem.
It does not provide sufficient guidance on the two burden of proof
questions, nor does it consider the relationship between the various
constitutive elements of jurisdiction within a general approach to judicial
jurisdiction in private international law.
IV. A Principled Approach to the Burden of Proof Issue
As explained earlier the main rationale underlying the Spiliada allocation
rule is the perceived exorbitant nature of "assumed" or statute-based
jurisdiction following service ex juris under Order 11.6' As a result,
English courts do not consider Order 11 jurisdiction to be legitimate for
the purpose of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under
supra note 55 at 857-60. Hogg states that there is no presumption ofconstitutionality in the case
of a Charter claim whereas one exists in the case of a challenge based on division of powers.
The burden on the party opposing the jurisdiction on a constitutional ground may therefore vary
according to the nature of the claim.
66. Indeed, the novelty of Hunt is its "discovery" ofa constitutional principle of full faith and
credit requiring recognition and enforcement of provincial judgments that draws on different
sections of both the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Charter as well as "sub-constitutional
factors." See V. Black & A.W. MacKay, "Constitutional Alchemy iP the Supreme Court: Hunt
v. T & Nplc" (1994) 5 N.J.C.L. 79.
67. Morguard, supra note 2 at 11 10. Article 7 states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice." The suggestion stems from the potential influence of
American caselaw on interstate jurisdiction which has long been discussed in terms of due
process. See for example, A.R. Stein, "Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law
of Personal Jurisdiction" (1987) 65 Texas L.R. 689.
68. It should be noted that Lord Goff sought to mitigate this point by suggesting that some
bases are more exorbitant than others and that each "head" of Order 11 should be assessed on
its own merit. Spiliada, supra note 7 at 481.
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common law rules.69 Since Morguard, however, the rules of recognition
in Canada have dramatically changed, putting an end to the suitability of
this rationale in the interprovincial context.
Morguard effectively rejected the narrowness of the common law
rules of recognition and enforcement and expanded them to include a new
method of evaluating the legitimacy of a foreign court's jurisdiction.70
The Supreme Court held that in addition to the traditional common law
recognition rules based exclusively on the defendant's presence in (or
submission to) the rendering jurisdiction, foreign judicial competence
based on a real and substantial subject-matter connection to that forum
would justify, at least between Canadian common law provinces, the
recognition and enforcement of extra-provincial judgments.7' This new
and improved common law rule of recognition was given constitutional
status in Hunt (decided after Amchem72) and has since been extended by
lower courts to judgments of foreign countries.
73
69. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
70. There is an extensive literature on the recognition and enforcement aspects of Morguard
including: E. Edinger, "Morguard v. De Savoye: Subsequent Developments" (1993) 22 Can.
Bus. L.J. 29; J.A. Woods, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Between
Provinces: The Constitutional Dimensions of MorguardInvestments Ltd." (1993) 22 Can. Bus.
L.J. 104; V. Black and J. Swan, "New Rules for the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments" (1991)
12 Advocates' Q. 489; H.P. Glenn, "Foreign Judgments, the Common Law and the Constitu-
tion" (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 537.
71. Morguard did not specify whether the connections were cumulative or alternative as to
the parties (defendant and/or plaintiff), the action (and/or merely the transaction) and the
forum. This ambiguity is not resolved in Hunt or in the most recent pronouncement of the
Supreme Court on private international law in Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, [1995]
120 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 1 W.W.R. 609 [hereinafter cited to S.C.R.].
72. Since the constitutionalization of the "full faith and credit" obligation within Canada,
Quebec Civil Code provisions governing recognition and enforcement are subject to the
limitations specified in Morguard and restated in Hunt. The Court in Hunt refused to consider
whether provincial rules could apply stricter conditions to judgments from non-Canadian
jurisdictions (supra note 3 at 331). Although Hunt was decided after Amchem, it was argued
before the decision was handed down in Amchem. And since Sopinka J. sat on both cases (and
on Morguard), it is entirely reasonable to infer that he was aware of the impending
constitutionalization of Morguard in Hunt. The closeness of the decisions in time makes the
reasoning in Amchem all the more puzzling, particulary in light of the fact that the bench was
virtually identical in all three cases.
73. See, for example, Moses v. Shore Boat Builders (1993), 83 B.C.L.R. (2d) 17-7 (application
for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed (1994), 87 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxii, La Forest,
Sopinka and Major JJ.); Arrowmaster Inc. v. Unique Forming Ltd. (1993), 17 O.R. (3d) 407
(Gen. Div.); contra: Dodd v. Gambin Assoc. (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 803 (Gen. Div.). Since
Morguard's arguments for reforming the common law rules were based on principles of private
international law as well as constitutional reasoning, the extension of the recognition rule is
justified in the absence of specific limitations to interprovincial judgments. This conclusion is
reinforced by the Supreme Court's refusal to hear an appeal in Moses despite the B.C. Court
of Appeal's clear call for direction on this point.
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The upshot of these cases is that jurisdiction over out-of-province
defendants can be legitimate both from the perspective of the rendering
court and the recognizing court based on a real and substantial connection
test. This follows from La Forest J.'s statement in Morguard that "the
conditions governing the taking of jurisdiction by the courts of one
province and those under which [judgments] are enforced by the courts
of another province should be viewed as correlative."74 The new Cana-
dian position therefore corrects the absence of correlation in English law
that serves to justify the process governing service ex juris and stays of
proceedings.
Given this potentially convincing ground for challenging the Spiliada
allocation of the burden of proof based on the location of service, it is
surprising that Sopinka J. did not even allude to it. In fact, the only
references to Morguardin Amchem are to its general statements about the
role of comity as a fundamental principle of Canadian private interna-
tional law. ccording to Amchem, resort to anti-suit injunctions is made
necessary by the inconsistent commitment to comity on a world-wide
basis that can lead to inappropriate assumptions of jurisdiction over
international cases.7 6 It is clear, therefore, that Sopinka J. sees a link
between Morguard and Amchem, at least at a macro level. The failure to
explicitly integrate the two decisions in elaborating the test for forum non
conveniens is curious. It is not, however, particularly surprising given the
Supreme Court's general reluctance to define the interaction between the
various elements ofjudicial jurisdiction in private international law. Such
a stand is unfortunate in light of numerous lower court decisions that
demonstrate confusion on these basic issues.77
74. Supra note 2 at 1094.
75. A discussion of La Forest and Sopinka JJ.'s reliance on a version of comity endorsed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) lies outside of this essay.
Scepticism as to the value and meaning of that version is clearly established in G.B. Baker,
"Interstate Choice of Law and Early-American Constitutional Nationalism" (1993) 38 McGill
L.J. 454. See also R. Wisner, "Uniformity, Diversity and Provincial Extraterritoriality:
Hunt v. T& Nplc" (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 759.
76. The Court in Amchem comes to consider the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a step
in a court's evaluation of a request to grant an anti-suit injunction to stop litigation in a foreign
court. In short, a preliminary requirement in such a case is that the foreign court be inappropriate
according to aforum non conveniens analysis.
77. For example, in the case of Webb v. Hooper, supra note 5, the Alberta Court applied the
Amchem test on forum non conveniens in deciding whether to recognize a Kentucky judgment.
In the view of the court, the Amchem test was simply equivalent to the Morguard test. In Kelly
v. KMart Canada, supra note 5 at para. 11, a British Columbia judge argued that "the principles
applicable for leave to grant service exjuris do not have application" to a stay of proceedings
pursuant to service in juris and then sought the test for forum non conveniens in Amchem,
Spiliada and Antares. Finally in Tortel Communications v. Suntel, supra note 5, the Manitoba
Court of Appeal relied on forum non conveniens as a justification for finding that the plaintiff
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V. Outline of a Solution
Although the full implications of Morguard and Hunt on provincial rules
of jurisdiction and service exjuris are only beginning to be fleshed out in
the courts, it is clear that the revolution in recognition rules requires a
reassessment of jurisdiction itself with consequent alterations of forum
non conveniens. Specifically, the distinction and relationship between
establishing judicial competence and exercising it needs to be clarified.
In its two pronouncements on the issue besides Morguard and Amchem,
the Court has either expressly refused to consider the relation between
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens or has simply posited the contin-
ued coexistence of these two elements.78 The Supreme Court in Hunt
proffered a general statement, expressly refusing to explore the issue
further. Speaking for the Court, La Forest J. stated:
I need not, for the purposes of this case, consider the relative merits of
adopting a broad or narrow basis for assuming jurisdiction and the
consequences of this decision for the use of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.... I need not consider the implications, if any, of Morguard
on choice of law and other aspects of conflicts law .... [T]he assumption
of and the discretion not to exercise jurisdiction must ultimately be guided
by the requirements of order and fairness, not a mechanical counting of
contacts or connections.79
This terse comment did not address the problem caused by reliance in
both Morguard and Amchem on a rule of real and substantial connection
in relation to both jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. However, a
passage in Tolofson v. Jensen suggests that the Court continues to treat
forum non conveniens as a separate process. Having reiterated that a real
and substantial connection is required to establish jurisdiction, La Forest
J. indicated:
had not met the criteria for service ex juris without leave. The Court cited the passage in
Amchem relating to juridical advantage as the statement of principle, the conclusion being that
a juridical advantage could not found the jurisdiction of the court.
Of even greater concern is the failure of some courts to recognize the authority ofAmchem
for theforum non conveniens doctrine. For example, none of the following cases cites Amchem
and many rely on precedents that have been implicitly overturned by the Supreme Court
decision: Carroll v. Wag-Aero, [1994] N.S.J. No. 550 (S.C.); Johnson v. Hall, [1994] N.S.J.
No. 472 (S.C.); StewartEstate v. Stewart Estate, [19941 N.W.T.J. No. 23 (S.C.); G.N. Johnston
Equipment v. Remstar International, [1994] N.B.J. No. 366 (Q.B.); Dairy Producers Co-op v.
Agrifoods Int'l, [19941 S.J. No. 301 (Q.B.) and Confederation Trust v. Discovery Towers,
[1994] B.C.J. No. 1040 (C.A.).
78. For further analysis of this question see V. Black, "The Other Side of Morguard: New
Limits on Judicial Jurisdiction" (1993) 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 4 at 20ff, see also C. Walsh, "Case
Comment: Hunt v. T & Nplc" (1994) 73 Can. Bar Rev. 394 at 412-13.
79. Hunt, supra note 3 at 326.
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In addition, through the doctrine of forum non conveniens a court may
refuse to exercise jurisdiction where, under the rule elaborated in Amchem,
... there is a more convenient or appropriate forum elsewhere."s
This implies that given a real and substantial connection (based on
personal or subject-matter connections) the court can nonetheless stay the
action on the basis of forum non conveniens. It must be assumed,
therefore, that the test is not identical in both cases.8' One aspect of the
burden of proof analysis in relation to forum non conveniens suggests
how and why this distinction should be maintained.
As explained previously, the different allocation of the burden of proof
in English law is related to the source of the court's jurisdictional
competence. In Spiliada, Lord Goff attributed much weight to the process
established under Order I L82 Amchem's rejection of Spiliada on this
point-on the basis of incompatibility with provincial rules of proce-
dure-may suggest that the removal of the leave requirement in Canada
has had a double effect. At a merely procedural level, it puts service in
juris on the same footing as service exjuris. At a more substantive level,
it tends to collapse the distinction between personal and subject-matter
connections that has traditionally paralleled the location of service:
Whereas jurisdiction based on service injuris has typically been justified
because of a connection between the defendant and the forum, a subject-
matter connection to the forum has supported service ex juris to grant
competence over foreign defendants located outside the traditional in
personam reach of the court.83 Since the jurisdiction of the common law
court flows from service on the defendant, the breakdown of the distinc-
tion between service in and out of the jurisdiction could easily imply a
corresponding assimilation of the underlying connections.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Morguard and Hunt do not support
such a conclusion. In the former case, La Forest J. explicitly stated that
presence-based jurisdiction, unlike subject-matter connection, needed no
80. Tolofson v. Jensen, supra note 71 at 1049 [hereinafter Tolofson].
81. For a defence of this position, see Black, supra note 78 at 20ff. According to Black, there
are valid arguments for maintaining both elements in conformity with the principles of order
and fairness as they take shape within the unique constitutional framework of the Canadian
federation.
82. Supra note 21 at 480-81.
83. This distinction is also important from the point of view of timing. Service injuris is valid
where the defendant was present/resident in the jurisdiction at the time of service; in other
words, the personal connection between the defendant and the foruni need only exist at the time
of litigation. For the purpose of service exjuris, however, the connection between the subject-
matter and the forum must necessarily exist at the time the cause of action arose. The
competence of a court on the basis of subject-matter connections will therefore survive beyond
the time the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction.
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further justification to be considered appropriate. 4 In other words,
service in juris is presumed to conform to the real and substantial
connection test and therefore confer legitimate jurisdiction on the court
despite the absence of any other connections between the case and the
forum. In Hunt, La Forest J. retreated somewhat from this position,
suggesting instead that traditional common law bases "may require
reconsideration in light of Morguard'.5 This comment was arguably
directed at transient presence which is still sufficient to found jurisdiction
"as of right" in English law86 (although its validity for recognition
purposes has been subject to doubt87). In light of Morguard's primary
concern for order and fairness, it is difficult to conceive how jurisdiction
based solely on a defendant's temporary presence in the forum, absent
any other connection with the cause of action or the defendant, could ever
conform to the standard established by the Supreme Court.
The rejection of transient presence does not imply a rejection of
presence-based jurisdiction based on personal links between the defen-
dant and the forum--"personal" being used in contrast to "subject-
matter." On the contrary, a limited personal basis for judicial jurisdiction
is essential to secure access to justice in the absence of a subject-matter
nexus with a single state or province.88 The intrinsic validity of this
jurisdictional basis is recognized by most countries. For example, in the
European Union, the Brussels Convention adopts the domicile of the
defendant as the primary jurisdictional basis.89 More recently, a special
commission of the Hague Conference, of which Canada is a member,
found an international "consensus... in favour of accepting a basis for
jurisdiction founded on the links which a defendant ... has with the
84. Morguard, supra note 2 at 1103-04.
85. Hunt, supra note 3 at 325.
86. It is precisely the potential inequity arising from the transient presence rule that gave rise
to a control mechanism in English law that eventually developed into the forum non conveniens
doctrine articulated in Spiliada. The English courts have, however, abdicated any responsibil-
ity for changing the common law rule, claiming that it is too long established to permit judicial
amendment: Adams v. Cape Industries, [1990] Ch. 433 (C.A.). The same has been said in the
U.S.: Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); and recently in Canada:
Exta-Sea Charters v. Formalog (1991), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) 197 (S.C.).
87. Residence is recognized, at common law, as a proper jurisdictional basis for recognition
purposes. There is authority for the view that mere presence is sufficient as well: Carrick v.
Hancock (1895), 12 T.L.R. 59 (Q.B.) although it is criticized on the basis that English law
controls the transient presence rule internally, something that it does not do at the recognition
stage. See Cheshire & North, supra note 11 at 349-50. But see Carrick Estates Ltd. v. Young
(1987), 43 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (Sask. C.A.).
88. Amchem's statement, supra note 4 at 911, that a situation involving multiple defendants
linked to several jurisdictions is the reality of modem litigation is an argument in favour of
subject-matter connection, not an argument against presence-based jurisdiction.
89. See supra note 28.
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forum."9 The deficiency of the common law presence rule lies only in the
absence of a durability element.
Assuming the adoption of a more substantial criterion such as resi-
dence as opposed to mere presence, subjection to "home" jurisdiction
would not involve any prima facie injustice to the defendant. Provided
that residence is defined in terms that ensure a real and substantial
connection between the defendant and the forum, it fulfils the conditions
of order and fairness that "must underlie a modern system of private
international law ... to ensure the security of transactions with justice." 9'
A residence rule meets the requirements of certainty and predictability
which serve both order and fairness. The fairness principle also seeks to
prevent subjecting the defendant to a jurisdiction with which she has no
connections; this is respected under a residence rule defined in terms of
real and substantial connections between the party and the forum. Barring
unequivocal language by the Court or legislative intervention, personal
jurisdiction should be assumed to endure alongside the statutory grounds
based mainly on subject-matter.92
From the premise that the distinction between personal and subject-
matter connections survives Morguard and Hunt, it is possible to envis-
age placing the burden on the plaintiff seeking to establish jurisdiction
based on subject-matter, outside the "personal" jurisdiction of the defen-
dant. Hence, in the absence of a personal connection between the
defendant and the forum, the plaintiff would have to justify the chosen
court's taking of jurisdiction on the basis of connections between the
action and the forum. On the assumption that subjecting a non-resident to
local jurisdiction involves some element of due process, placing the
burden on the plaintiff to justify this assertion ofjurisdiction would create
a built-in procedural control over long-arm jurisdiction without reintro-
ducing a prior leave requirement.
On the other hand, if residence becomes the requisite connection for
personal jurisdiction, defined in terms of a real and substantial connection
excluding subject-matter links, the legitimacy (and hence constitutional-
ity) of that jurisdiction is implicit. There is no need, in such circum-
stances, to control the plaintiff's choice of the place of litigation and
90. Pevanesxt Bureau of the Hague. Cotiferece tt Private Isterattotat Law, Con.clsioa of
the Special Commission of June 1994 on the Question of the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civiland CommercialMatters, Preliminary Document No. 1. at para. 12.
91. Morguard, supra note 2 at 1097. See also C. Walsh, supra note 78 at 404-09.
92. If this accurately reflects the state of Canadian law on judicial jurisdiction in a private
international law perspective, the similarity with the English system is substantively intact
despite procedural divergences. Rejection of the Spiliada allocation rule cannot succeed, in
principle, on this point.
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therefore the burden can remain on the defendant to rebut the presumption
that his or her residence, in fact, does not conform to the constitutional
requirement.93
Although it is possible to collapse personal and subject-matter connec-
tion into a general "real and substantial connections" test, the mainte-
nance of two separate grounds is preferable. For one, it underscores the
conceptual distinction between the two bases: one based on membership
in a community and the other based on activity affecting a community .
94
This approach also abstracts from the location of service, concentrating
instead on the jurisdictional basis itself. This serves to emphasize that
since Morguard, jurisdiction should be considered in substantive terms
whereas rules of service have become merely procedural. In addition, if
the Supreme Court wishes to maintain a separate role for forum non
conveniens, the two types of jurisdictional connections-personal and
subject-matter-should remain autonomous, that is, they should each
have to be sufficient to establish jurisdiction. A court's discretion to
decline jurisdiction would then combine factors going to both types of
connections to determine the appropriateness of the forum from aforum
non conveniens perspective. Questions of convenience and expense
which are not considered at the primary jurisdictional stage would come
into play as would other connections not normally considered relevant to
found jurisdiction such as the residence of the plaintiff.95
Since both the Morguard and Amchem tests rely on the "real and
substantial connection" criterion, the division ofjudicial jurisdiction into
two types with specific connecting factors will prevent confusion and
facilitate the application of the rules. In particular, it will avert any
attempt to balance the various connections at the primary stage of
establishing the competence of the court by confining the evaluation to
a single type of connection. By restricting the broad balancing analysis
based on all the factors to the forum non conveniens stage, the issue of
actual competence is more likely to be adequately assessed on its own
93. Where the plaintiff carries the burden of justifying his choice of jurisdiction, it would be
necessary to allow the defendant to contest the legitimacy of jurisdiction at the enforcement
stage. Forcing the defendant to challenge at the outset would defeat the purpose of the burden
allocation. This approach maintains the plaintiff's ability to seek a default judgment, thereby
balancing the plaintiff's and the defendant's rights according to the principles of order and
fairness.
94. This terminology is borrowed from L. Brilmayer, "Liberalism, Community, and State
Borders" (1991) 41 Duke L.J. 1.
95. A list of relevant factors was suggested by Low J. in Stern v. Dove Audio, [1994] B.C.J.
No. 1098: residence of parties; where parties carry on business; where cause of action arose;
where loss/damage occurred; juridical advantage to plaintiff; juridical disadvantage to defen-
dant; convenience to potential witnesses; cost of conducting litigation; difficulty and cost of
proving foreign law; applicable substantive law; parallel proceedings in other jurisdictions.
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merits.96 Considering also the different standard for review of constitu-
tional decisions as opposed to exercises of discretion, there is much to be
gained at appellate levels by simplifying the process for lower courts.
97
By maintaining the autonomy of personal and subject-matter connec-
tions, the likelihood of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
is also enhanced. The foreign rendering court's jurisdiction will comply
with the Canadian private international law requirement of order and
fairness in the assumption of jurisdiction on the basis of either personal
or subject-matter connections. Where, for example, a state of the Euro-
pean Union has taken jurisdiction on the basis of domicile, a Canadian
court will be prepared to enforce the resulting judgment irrespective of an
absence of subject-matter connection between the case and the rendering
forum. Any other result would contradict the objective of Morguard by
narrowing as opposed to broadening the grounds for recognition and
enforcement; it would also undermine the "correlative" relation between
enforcement rules and jurisdictional rules that underlies much of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in that case. Moreover, it would indicate that
a foreign court's conformity with the first stage of jurisdictional scrutiny,
defined according to the Morguard standard, is sufficient for recognition
purposes. On the other hand, conformity with the second stage, defined
according to the forum non conveniens test in Amchem, would become
necessary for anti-suit injunctions.
Overall, therefore, the legitimacy of a jurisdictional claim should be
assessed at the primary stage of establishing the competence of the court
while the appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction should be gauged at
the secondary forum non conveniens stage. At the primary stage, the
plaintiff should be required to justify a jurisdictional claim over a non-
resident defendant. At the secondary stage, however, once the court's
96. The court in Macdonald v. Lasnier, supra note 59, failed to clearly distinguish between
these two phases of jurisdiction. In determining whether the assumption of jurisdiction was
constitutional, the Court considered several factors usually relevant to aforum non conveniens
analysis. For example, the Court mentioned the location of witnesses and documents (at 182).
When the Court then came to determine whether it should exercise its discretion to decline
jurisdiction, there was little further analysis because most of the factors had already been
balanced for the constitutional argument.
97. Maintenance of the division is not problematic from a constitutional point of view since
the Supreme Court has admitted the legitimacy of concurrent judicial jurisdiction. See in
particular, Morguard at 1109: "it is simply anachronistic to uphold a... single situs for torts
or contracts for the proper exercise of jurisdiction." This should be contrasted with the
conclusion in Tolofson on choice of law. There La Forest J. held that while a province may be
theoretically competent to regulate its residents' out-of-province activity, "it is arguable that
it is not constitutionally permissible for both the province where certain activities took place
and the province of the residence of the parties to deal with civil liability arising out of the same
activities" (supra note 71 at 1066).
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competence has been constitutionally and internationally validated, the
onus should be on the defendant to identify a clearly more appropriate
foreign court thereby persuading the domestic court that it should decline
to exercise its jurisdiction, being a forum non conveniens. Such a
framework would reconcile the Supreme Court's explicit statements in
Morguard about international and constitutional constraints on jurisdic-
tion with its implicit distinction in Morguard, Hunt, and Tolofson,
between the assumption of jurisdiction and the discretion to exercise it.
In the end, therefore, Justice Sopinka may have been right to dismiss
the location of service in Amchem as merely procedural. This article has
attempted to show that this finding has much broader implications that
require a comprehensive review of international judicial jurisdiction by
the Supreme Court in its bid to construct a "rational and workable system
of private international law" based on the "underlying reality of the
international legal order. ' '9"
98. Tolofson, supra note 7) at 1047-48.
